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AL-QAEDA AND THE LAW OF WAR
by
Mark Weisburd∗
Nearly since September 11 itself, the legal community has been debating the
legal status of al-Qaeda members—criminals versus combatants of war.
Though there are many lenses through which one can view this issue, this
Article examines the question in terms of individual rights of al-Qaeda
members under international law. The author puts the issue in context by
first discussing the significance of the label—the distinction in treatment
between criminal suspects and prisoners of war. Then, the Article analyzes
al-Qaeda and its operations to determine where its members might fall on the
continuum from criminal to combatant. Ultimately, the Article suggests that,
at least when considering their personal rights under international law, alQaeda members should be considered combatants of war, rather than
criminals. However, the nature of al-Qaeda makes it difficult to apply
international humanitarian law to the group, with interesting implications
for the future of this area of law.
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INTRODUCTION

Beginning almost on September 11, 2001, itself, there has been
considerable controversy as to how the legal system ought to deal with
members of al-Qaeda, other than those captured on the battlefield
fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan or with insurgents in Iraq.
That is, what legal standard should be applied to members of that
organization who are operating away from any zone of open combat, but
are believed to be engaged in activities with significant connections to
planned acts of violence?
∗ Martha M. Brandis Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of
Law. A.B. Princeton University; J.D. University of Michigan.
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These issues may touch on a number of areas of law. To the extent
the question regards the authority of the U.S. government to take certain
actions within American territory, it would hardly be surprising if the
Constitution imposed limits, whatever international law may say about
the matter. If the United States acts in the territory of some other state,
questions of respect for that state’s sovereignty obviously arise. Finally,
one may focus on the rights personal to members of al-Qaeda and
created by international law. This Article addresses the last of these
subjects.
With respect to that issue, some have argued that al-Qaeda members
1
should simply be treated as criminals. Others have argued that it is more
appropriate to see actions taken to deal with such groups as war. While
no one, as far as I know, has argued that members of groups like alQaeda are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war, the war analogy
would suggest that international humanitarian law rather than the law of
criminal procedure would provide the starting point for any discussion of
2
their treatment.
More turns on this issue than a matter of syntax. The label applied to
members of al-Qaeda-like groups determines, among other things, the
circumstances in which deadly force may be used against them and in
which they may be taken prisoner, the duration of any confinement to
which they are subjected, and the rules which must be followed when
3
such persons are interrogated.
This Article will seek to explain this problem and suggest a
resolution. It will first provide more details as to the differences in
treatment which depend on the label applied to actions taken against alQaeda. It will then seek to explain the differences between the treatment
accorded combatants in war and that applied to criminal suspects in the
4
United States. The Article will go on to describe the nature of al-Qaeda
and its operations and, in light of that description, will attempt to
determine where the actions of al-Qaeda fall on a continuum between
crime and war and the implications of that conclusion for considerations
of the legal status of members of the group. The penultimate section of
the Article will suggest that the problems al-Qaeda presents raise doubts
1

See, e.g., Anthony Dworkin, Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of Human
Rights in the War on Terror, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? 53, 54 (David Wippman &
Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
2
See, e.g., William K. Lietzau, Combating Terrorism: The Consequences of Moving from
Law Enforcement to War, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?, supra note 1, at 31.
3
See discussion infra notes 5–20.
4
For the sake of simplicity and in light of the intended audience, the discussion
of criminal procedure in this Article focuses on procedural rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States as a proxy for procedural rights al-Qaeda members
would enjoy by virtue of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts.
9, 10, 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR] since the
guarantees are similar and there is considerably more authoritative exposition of the
U.S. Constitution than there is of the ICCPR.
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about whether some of the basic assumptions of international
humanitarian law can be applied in the efforts to reduce or eliminate the
threat posed by such organizations. The conclusion will draw all this
together and suggest further reasons for concern.
II. WHY THE LABEL MATTERS

When Richard Reid, the so-called “shoe bomber,” was sentenced
upon his conviction for his attempt to blow up an airplane in flight, the
5
trial judge was at pains to insist that Reid was a criminal, not a soldier.
“[T]o call you a soldier,” Judge Young said, “gives you far too much
6
stature.”
The distinction Judge Young drew is hardly uncommon. Soldiers are
considered respectable; criminals are not. It is, however, not always
soldiers who are favored if rules regarding dealing with criminal violence
are compared to the provisions of the law of war. As will be seen, even
7
lawful combatants in an armed conflict are entitled to much less
protection than are criminal suspects in the United States.
At the outset, one problem should be noted. Treaties central to the
8
law of war declare themselves applicable in cases of “armed conflict.”
There is some controversy as to whether the actions of al-Qaeda can
9
properly be classified as armed conflict. However, even if it would be a
mistake to assert that international humanitarian law as currently
structured squarely applies to the operations of al-Qaeda outside zones of
open conflict, it does not follow that concepts drawn from that body of

5
Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History Revisited and Law
Revised, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?, supra note 1, at 75.
6
Id.
7
For ease of reference, this Article will use the label “combatants” to refer to all
persons who take part in hostilities which are part of an “armed conflict” in the sense
of the law of war. Those combatants who would qualify as prisoners of war if captured
will be referred to as “lawful combatants.”
8
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts art. 1, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I].
9
See CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, War, Terrorism and International Law, in ESSAYS ON
WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 430 (2006) [hereinafter GREENWOOD, War, Terrorism
and International Law].
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law cannot be useful in considering how al-Qaeda members ought to be
treated.
With this caveat, we can return to explaining what differences in the
law regarding treatment of al-Qaeda members flow from the
determination as to whether their activities should be considered
essentially criminal or, instead, better analogized to war. Most
fundamentally, the two bodies of law differ regarding the legality of
killing. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides, “Members
of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel
and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in
10
hostilities.” In other words, lawful combatants on one side of an armed
conflict may lawfully kill combatants on the other side.
In contrast, there are serious restrictions in American law on the
circumstances in which officials may use force against a criminal suspect.
11
According to Tennessee v. Garner:
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony
suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable. . . . Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing
to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.
. . . A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous
suspect by shooting him dead. . . .
. . . Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer
or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent
escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the
officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he
has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if
necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning
12
has been given.

In short, combatants may be killed by their adversaries simply because
they are combatants; criminals may not be killed by law enforcement
personnel unless relatively specific and fairly uncommon conditions are
satisfied.
A second distinction between the law relating to criminal violence
and the law of war relates to the circumstances in which a person may be
10

Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 43(2). The United States is not a party to Protocol
I, but there is reason to believe that article 43(2) is, in this respect, considered to state
customary international law. See GREENWOOD, War, Terrorism and International Law,
supra note 9; CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, The Customary Law Status of the 1977 Protocols,
in ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 179, 192 [hereinafter
GREENWOOD, 1977 Protocols]; 1 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 11 (1986).
11
471 U.S. 1 (1985).
12
Id. at 11–12.
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detained. During hostilities, persons entitled to prisoner of war status
assume that status “from the time they fall into the power of the
13
enemy.” That is, lawful combatants who find themselves in control of
opposing combatants are not obliged to follow any procedural steps in
order to impose prisoner of war status on those of their captives who fall
into one of the categories of combatants entitled to prisoner of war
status; capture itself suffices. Further, if persons entitled to prisoner of
war status may be taken captive without their captors following any
particular procedural steps, it must follow that persons taking part in
hostilities but not entitled to prisoner of war status enjoy no greater level
of protection.
In American law, however, there are strict limitations on the right of
the authorities to detain someone against his will. An individual may be
arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, but warrants may issue only if
14
probable cause for arrest is demonstrated. If a law enforcement officer
seeks to make an arrest without a warrant, he must have probable cause
15
for the arrest. Further, if an arrest is made without a warrant, a judge
must determine that probable cause exists to hold the arrestee, normally
16
within forty-eight hours of the arrest.
Further, prisoners of war may be detained for the duration of
17
hostilities between their captor and the group for which they fought.
Necessarily, the duration of their captivity cannot be determined at the
time of their capture. In contrast, persons convicted of crimes are
obliged to serve for a fixed period with, in many cases, the possibility of
early release, for example, on parole.
Finally, the situations of criminal suspects and prisoners of war also
differ regarding limits placed on interrogation after detention.
According to the law of war, “No physical or mental torture, nor any
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse
to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or
18
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” However, that body of law does
13

Geneva III, supra note 8, art. 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
15
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
16
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
17
Geneva III, supra note 8, art. 118.
18
Geneva III, supra note 8, art. 17. Not all persons liable to capture are entitled
to treatment as prisoners of war. Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 43, 44, 51(3), 75(1).
Persons subject to the law of armed conflict who are captured but are not entitled to
prisoner of war status are not, however, completely unprotected; their captors are
forbidden to resort to:
14

(a) Violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular: (i) Murder; (ii) Torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental; (iii)
Corporal punishment; and (iv) [Mutilation]; (b) Outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (c) The taking of hostages; (d)
Collective punishments; and (e) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
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not forbid requiring prisoners of war to submit to interrogation, and if
prisoners of war cannot avoid interrogation, one must assume that the
same is true for captured combatants not entitled to prisoner of war
status. In the law of the United States, the police are also forbidden to
19
coerce criminal suspects into confessing. But in addition to this right, a
criminal suspect has the right to remain silent in the face of interrogation
and to be informed of this right by law enforcement officers. He must
also be informed that, if he chooses to speak, whatever he says may be
used against him in court and that he has a right to an attorney—at
government expense if he cannot pay for his own counsel. The suspect
has the right to end the interrogation at any time, and the interrogation
must end if the suspect indicates a desire for an attorney until the suspect
has had an opportunity to consult his attorney.
In summary, combatants face disadvantages violent criminals do not.
Combatants may be shot on sight by their opponents, detained without
any sort of process, and questioned at the discretion of their captors and
without the assistance of anyone. Combatants are also unable to know the
length of their captivity, since that depends on events beyond the control
of their captors.
If dealing with al-Qaeda is treated as a criminal matter, then, persons
suspected of being members of that organization would be entitled to
considerably gentler treatment than would combatants on a battlefield, at
20
least before the al-Qaeda members were convicted of a crime. But why

Id. art. 75(2). The United States is not a party to Protocol I, but apparently regards
article 75 as declaratory of customary international law. GREENWOOD, 1977 Protocols,
supra note 10, at 188–89.
19
See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
20
Of course, if an al-Qaeda member is convicted and imprisoned, the conditions
in which he is held may be grim. Consider the following description—taken from
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)—of the nature of the confinement Ohio
imposed upon its most troublesome prisoners, including some placed in that
category solely because of the nature of their offense:
[A]lmost every aspect of an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Inmates
must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A
light remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed, and an
inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further discipline.
During the one hour per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited
to one of two indoor recreation cells.
Incarceration at OSP [Ohio State Penitentiary] is synonymous with extreme
isolation. In contrast to any other Ohio prison, including any segregation unit,
OSP cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms
which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are
taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a common eating area.
Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through
glass walls. It is fair to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any environmental
or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.
Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at OSP is for an indefinite
period of time, limited only by an inmate’s sentence. For an inmate serving a life
sentence, there is no indication how long he may be incarcerated at OSP once
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should combatants in war be treated differently from criminals? It is to
that question the discussion now turns.
III. CRIME, WAR, AND VIOLENCE

As just discussed, there is a significant difference between the
treatment that the U.S. government would normally accord criminals and
that permitted by the international law of war. This section of the Article
will attempt to explain that difference.
To take criminal violence first, some generalizations regarding that
phenomenon are easy to defend. Preliminarily, I will define the term,
“criminal violence” as violence perpetrated by relatively small groups of
individuals for private ends. Their potential victims include essentially
everyone. While the consequences of any individual crime can be
devastating for the victim, the material effects on society at large are
generally limited (though it is of course true that a perception that
violent crime has become relatively common can lead to an increase in
anxiety among members of the public). Further, it is reasonable to
assume that perpetrators are relatively highly motivated to engage in
criminal violence, since they do so despite awareness of potential
negative consequences, e.g., the risk of what may be severe punishment
and the possibility of serious reputational harm.
Inter-state war as waged by states differs from crime, first of all, in the
connection between the individuals who actually carry out the violence
and the entity which sets the violence in motion. With the exception of a
relatively small group of decision-makers, individuals participate as
agents, not as initiators. Individual participants understand, further, that
war is not intended to and almost surely will not advance their individual
interests except to the extent that they identify with the interests of the
21
entities they serve. On the contrary, the aspect of war’s impact on
participants which is likely to strike them most forcibly is the risk of death
or permanent injury. Also unlike criminals, participants in war are not
generally considered by their compatriots to be bad people because of
their participation in war; indeed, they are likely to be seen as
praiseworthy for undergoing the risks of war. Further, individuals take
part in war, not as free agents, but as part of a military organization; as
members of an organization, it is possible to subject those individuals to
assigned there. Inmates otherwise eligible for parole lose their eligibility while
incarcerated at OSP.

Id. at 214–15 (citation omitted). Placement in this prison was preceded by a thorough
process aimed at determining the propriety of the placement, in which the inmate
involved was allowed to participate. If he was confined in this prison, his status was
reviewed after thirty days, and at least annually thereafter. Id. at 216–17.
21
Of course, the statement in the text can apply only to conventional war as
currently waged; in the seventeenth century, when looting and rape were seen as
perquisites of persons engaging in war, the statement in the text would have been
false.
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strict discipline and to ensure that they obey orders that their superiors
issue. In particular, it may be assumed that if those superiors order their
subordinates to cease fighting, those orders will be obeyed. There is very
seldom any reason to assume that individual members of a state’s military
have so deep a personal investment in a war that they will insist on
continuing hostilities after their government has terminated hostilities.
War also differs from crime in the risks it poses to entities engaging
in it. A state that resorts to war does so to violently coerce its opponents
to conform to its desires, desires which may extend to the absolute
subjugation of the target of a war. The risks war poses for states are great
enough that they will expend extraordinary quantities of resources and
impose significant hardships on their citizens in order to defeat their
enemies. Under conditions of modern war, this means that casualties
among members of the military can be very high. Further, since
legitimate targets in inter-state war include militarily-related industries
and transportation links, and since industries and transportation links
are often found in populated areas and serve civilian markets as well as
military customers, war has the potential to cause great loss of civilian life
22
and destruction of economic infrastructure as well. That is, being
engaged in war means that a state at least faces serious threats of damage
to life and property on a scale far exceeding that associated with
individual criminal enterprises; further, at the worst, war threatens a state
and its population with subjugation.
These factors, taken together, suggest explanations for the different
ways in which states employ their security forces to deal, respectively, with
crime and with war. If criminals act in small groups and there is little
limit on their targets, it would be very difficult to use security forces to
prevent crime; essentially, it would be necessary to use a very large
proportion of the population to keep those persons outside the security
forces under constant surveillance, and to permit the security forces to
interfere in any activity which aroused their suspicions. Such a system
would be impossibly expensive, relative to the expected harm from any
particular criminal activity, and would require a degree of control of the
population that could only be called totalitarian. Since, in the United
States, such a policy could only be applied with express or implicit
popular consent, it would not be applied unless a majority of the
population was sufficiently concerned about crime to accept the
restrictions on their own freedom such a policy would necessarily entail.
To date, at least, Americans have not shown themselves sufficiently
concerned about crime to acquiesce in such a system.
Instead of an intensively preventive approach, American
governments typically seek to deter crime by patrolling, by arresting
persons who are believed to have committed crime, and by punishing
22
RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE 136–37 (2005). This work is both
enlightening and thought-provoking for anyone seeking to address the issues to
which this Article is directed.
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those proven to have committed crime. That is, law enforcement
authorities take a primarily ex post approach to crime, devoting much of
their activity to assigning responsibility and inflicting penalties for past
crime. Americans are sufficiently aware of the risks to individual freedom
presented by permitting the government to seize and detain individuals
that they have accepted strict limitations on those authorities, in order to
ensure all criminal suspects are treated fairly. The authorities are
forbidden to arrest without evidence, are limited in the sort of evidence
they are permitted to acquire and in their evidence-gathering methods,
required to present a high degree of proof to establish the guilt of the
defendant, and are forbidden to punish the defendant until he is
convicted by a court, and then only to the extent the law permits and the
court determines. Punishment is inflicted on the basis of individual guilt
and justified as deterrence; as removing from society, at least temporarily,
a person whose choice to commit a criminal act despite the various costs
of doing so suggests that the person may choose to commit other such
acts; and, as far as some people are concerned, as justly punishing bad
behavior.
War presents a much different situation. Most significantly, war
either threatens the state with losses many orders of magnitude greater
than those caused by crime or offers the state opportunities to make
gains so great as to exceed the expected costs of war, as large as those
costs necessarily are. It is therefore important for the state to take positive
action either to defend itself or to attack, as the case may be, in order
either to avoid the threatened future harm or ensure the possible future
gain. War, that is, must have an ex ante focus: it must be an effort to
actively shape the future rather than merely to respond to events in the
past.
In line with this reasoning, belligerent states attempt to prevent their
adversaries from causing future harm by destroying their military forces;
obviously, killing or capturing the members of an adversary’s forces will
destroy those forces. If one could not kill members of the opposing
military on sight, or capture members of enemy armed forces without
going through time-consuming procedural steps, the delay imposed on
military operations could be significant and the risks of defeat greatly
increased. Permitting legal assistance to captured combatants in their
interrogations could prevent the gathering of information essential to
forestalling enemy action. On the other hand, lawful combatants in war
are not typically personally dangerous; there is no reason to assume that
such persons would have any reason to continue efforts to injure the state
holding them captive once the authorities they served have agreed to
stop fighting, and therefore their captors have no reason to detain them
beyond the end of hostilities. Since their service in the armed forces of
their state is by no means criminal, prisoners of war are not guilty of
anything simply by virtue of their military service—as The Manual of the
Law of Armed Conflict of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence puts it,
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23

enemy prisoners “were simply doing their duty” —and there is no reason
to treat them harshly.
There is one other factor relevant to a difference between the
treatment of criminals and that accorded combatants in war: the
difference in cost to the citizenry of the war-making state. That state’s
citizens may reasonably assume that the state’s authority to apply harsh
measures to members of an adversary’s armed forces will not be taken as
authority to apply such measures to the citizenry; that is, this situation
does not pose the risk to citizens presented by grants of broad authority
24
to treat criminals harshly.
In light of these differences, the distinctions in treatment between
criminals and combatants in war make some sense. Given the focus on
fairness and on limiting governmental interference with the great
majority of citizens, one can understand a decision to limit the right of
the police to use force, to demand that the government demonstrate why
someone should be arrested, and to regulate interrogation—with all such
activities, furthermore, focused on the past. Because criminals are
individually dangerous, however, it makes sense to subject them to a
punitive detention regime. Given the great risks war poses to a
community’s future and the lack of individual dangerousness of the
typical member of an enemy’s armed forces, it likewise makes sense that
members of opposing forces will be treated with great harshness on the
battlefield, but with relative moderation after surrender.
But if the distinction between the treatment of criminals and that of
members of opposing forces in war makes sense at a general level, it
remains to be considered how operations against al-Qaeda should be
characterized. Before that is possible, however, it is necessary to consider
how al-Qaeda functions. The next Part addresses this topic.
IV. THE NATURE OF AL-QAEDA

What, then, are the characteristics of al-Qaeda that are relevant,
beyond the obvious facts that it uses violence and is not a government?
First, its objectives are not limited to affecting any particular territory
or very specific group. It does not exercise what could be called
government-like control over any group or area, nor, apparently, does it
seek to do so. Likewise, it does not rely on the approval of any such group
to legitimate its actions. Of course, it purports to focus on all Muslims
and all territory ever subject to a caliphate, but so broad a focus is no
focus at all. These characteristics distinguish al-Qaeda from groups such
as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the I.R.A.—all of which (i) are oriented to
23
U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 141 (2004)
[hereinafter UK Manual].
24
Further, moderate treatment of enemy prisoners may be attractive as inducing
the enemy to treat moderately one’s fellow citizens who become prisoners—or maybe
not. See Eric Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 423, 429 (2005).
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what they claim to be the interests of particular groups in particular
places; (ii) seek to exercise power over those groups; and (iii) rely on the
support of those groups.
Second, al-Qaeda has, since at least 1996, made clear that it
considers itself at war with the United States. Furthermore, Osama bin
Laden has called for attacks on American civilians, not just on elements
of the U.S. government, justifying such attacks by noting that American
taxpayers fund the U.S. military and the U.S. government activities which
al-Qaeda considers so objectionable.
Third, since al-Qaeda uses violence for such purposes, it is unlikely
that its members would think of themselves as having “won” while
Muslims continue to live in separate states not governed according to the
letter of the Holy Qu’ran, and while they perceive the United States as
exercising hegemoniacal control over the world. Al-Qaeda can thus be
distinguished from criminal groups strictu sensu, whose goals are usually
assumed to be focused on material gain for group members.
Fourth, al-Qaeda has shown itself capable of inflicting violence on a
scale more commonly associated with military operations than with
activities of groups neither formed by governments nor aimed at seizing
control of a government, such as the Viet Cong. Equally important, alQaeda has made clear its desire to acquire weapons that would permit it
25
to inflict even greater levels of destruction.
Fifth, although there is evidence that thousands of individuals may
have passed through its training camps, and its current membership is
26
estimated at 50,000, al-Qaeda members tend to operate in small groups
and to attack undefended civilian targets. Although its members
apparently took part in conventional fighting at the time of the American
invasion of Afghanistan, as a general matter it lacks the capacity to
engage in conventional combat or to organize military units even of
moderate size. Relatedly, the number of attacks it has carried out is
relatively small. Al-Qaeda itself is credited with 32 attacks since its
formation in the late 1980s, killing approximately 3,500 people and
injuring approximately 8,900 more. Groups labeling themselves “alQaeda” have been responsible for an additional 34 attacks, excluding
those carried out in Iraq; these attacks have killed 46 people and injured
27
85.
The small size of the groups which carry out al-Qaeda operations
also facilitates the covert entry by group members into the territory of the

25
The foregoing description of al-Qaeda is culled from Dominic D. McAlea, PostWestphalian Crime, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?, supra note 1, at 111, 116–21, and
PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, AL-QAEDA: THE MANY FACES OF AN
ISLAMIST EXTREMIST THREAT, H.R. REP. NO. 109-615, at 6–10 (2006).
26
See Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Terrorism
Knowledge Base, Al-Qaeda, http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=6.
27
See MIPT, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Terrorist Incident Reports,
http://www.tkb.org/IncidentGroupModule.jsp [hereinafter MIPT/TKB].
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state al-Qaeda wishes to target. That is, a state must take into account the
serious possibility that al-Qaeda operatives within its borders will be a
main source of any violence perpetrated against it.
Nor is it clear that al-Qaeda’s internal structure is entirely
hierarchical. There is no dispute about its decentralized character, which
makes it unclear whether the persons believed to make up the leadership
of the group would be obeyed if they ordered al-Qaeda members, for
example, to treat any captured persons as required by international
humanitarian law. Rather, its members must be assumed to be highly
motivated as individuals and personally invested in the group attaining its
ends.
Finally, al-Qaeda, outside of Iraq, does not use force to achieve
conventional military objectives, such as taking and holding territory or
rendering opposing military units hors de combat. Rather, it uses violence
in order to frighten Westerners into bowing to its demands in order to
escape violence, and to rally Muslims to it by demonstrating the
vulnerability of Western states, by demonstrating its strength, and by
claiming the mantle of a successful punisher of unbelievers who have
28
attacked Islam. In other words, it uses violence as a form of propaganda.
These characteristics, taken together, demonstrate the difficulty of
dealing with al-Qaeda. Since it is not territorially limited, it cannot be
defeated by seizing this or that territory. In light of its lack of connection
to any particular population grouping, it need not consider the effects of
its actions on such groups and cannot be restrained by objections from
members of any such group. Its ideological orientation, millennial
objectives, and apparently visceral hatred of the United States mean that
it cannot achieve its objectives by improving the material circumstances
of its members; these characteristics also mean that it would not benefit
from and would probably disdain any sort of compromise, which in turn
means that it can neither be bribed into abandoning its activities nor
serve as a negotiating partner. In any event, its decentralized structure
raises doubts that leaders who sought compromise would necessarily be
obeyed by their nominal subordinates. It has used force on a scale
beyond the level any society could tolerate without some vigorous
response and seeks the capacity to cause even greater levels of
destruction. But the fact that its uses of force are intended to evoke
particular types of reactions from different publics, rather than to
accomplish definable military objectives, means that it is very difficult
even to identify all potential al-Qaeda targets, let alone devise a way to
defend them all. This is especially so given its demonstrated capability to
carry out operations essentially all over the world. Further, since al-Qaeda
attacks may well originate from within a state’s territory, any measures of
defense will have an impact on the citizens of the state, not simply on
members of al-Qaeda.
28

This observation was inspired by SMITH, supra note 22, especially at 167–68 and
267–305.
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What does all this suggest as to the proper label to apply to al-Qaeda?
That question will be addressed in the next Part.
V. FINDING A LEGAL LABEL FOR AL-QAEDA

The first point to be made about categorizing al-Qaeda is that its
signature operations do not fit neatly into existing categories of the law
of war. Those categories turn on the concept of “armed conflict.” Thus,
the four Geneva Conventions are focused primarily, and Protocol I
29
exclusively, on international armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions
also impose some limitations on behavior in armed conflicts “not of an
30
international character.” None of these legal instruments define armed
conflict, but the term has been the subject of considerable analysis.
Thus, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
31
held in Prosecutor v. Tadic that “an armed conflict exists whenever there
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
32
between such groups within a State.” That court went on to hold that
the fighting in the former Yugoslavia commencing in 1991 and
continuing into 1995 was an armed conflict because it involved
“protracted, large-scale violence between the armed forces of different
States and between governmental forces and organized insurgent
33
groups.”
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
34
concluded, in Juan Carlos Abella,
[T]he concept of armed conflict, in principle, requires the
existence of organized armed groups that are capable of and
actually do engage in combat and other military actions against
each other. . . . Common Article 3 is generally understood to apply
to low intensity and open armed confrontations between relatively
organized armed forces or groups that take place within the
territory of a particular State. . . . Article 3 armed conflicts typically
involve armed strife between governmental armed forces and
organized armed insurgents. It also governs situations where two or
more armed factions confront one another without the
intervention of governmental forces where, for example, the
established government has dissolved or is too weak to intervene. It

29

Geneva I, supra note 8, art. 2; Geneva II, supra note 8, art. 2; Geneva III, supra
note 8, art. 2; Geneva IV, supra note 8, art. 2, Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 1.
30
Geneva I, supra note 8, art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 8, art. 3; Geneva III, supra
note 8, art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 8, art. 3.
31
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 271 (1997).
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is important to understand that application of Common Article 3
does not require the existence of large-scale and generalized
hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which dissident
35
armed groups exercise control over parts of national territory.

The Commission went on to conclude that a thirty-hour episode
commencing with an attempt by a forty-two-person armed group to take
control of a military installation in La Tablada, Argentina, and ending
36
with the forcible recapture of the installation by security forces,
amounted to an armed conflict. In particular, the Commission observed:
What differentiates the events at the La Tablada base from [internal
disturbances] are the concerted nature of the hostile acts
undertaken by the attackers, the direct involvement of
governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the
violence attending the events in question. More particularly, the
attackers involved carefully planned, coordinated and executed an
armed attack, i.e., a military operation, against a quintessential
military objective - a military base. The officer in charge of the La
Tablada base sought, as was his duty, to repulse the attackers, and
President Alfonsín, exercising his constitutional authority as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, ordered that military
37
action be taken to recapture the base and subdue the attackers.
Again, Professor Christopher Greenwood has argued that al-Qaeda
cannot engage in armed conflict because it is not a state, because its
members cannot lawfully engage in armed conflict and, most relevant for
this discussion, because it lacks the practical capacity to engage in armed
38
conflict. He asserts,
[T]o say that [al-Qaeda has] a capacity to murder or destroy is not
the same thing as saying that they have the capacity to wage war.
Controlling no territory, having no courts or legal system and no
armed forces, their behaviour is a far cry from anything resembling
39
the conduct of war by a state.
There is thus considerable authority that the term armed conflict refers
to something like organized combat between two armed groups.
According to this understanding of the term, a group cannot be
understood to be engaged in armed conflict merely because it uses
violence for political ends. A group is engaged in armed conflict only if
those of its members who engage in violence organize themselves into
something resembling military units and direct their violence, at least in
part, at their opponents’ similarly organized groups.

35
36
37
38
39

Id. ¶ 152 .
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 155
GREENWOOD, War, Terrorism and International Law, supra note 9, at 430–31.
Id. at 431.
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As noted above, however, al-Qaeda does not conduct its operations
40
in this manner outside Afghanistan and Iraq. Its operations outside
those combat zones very often involve suicide attacks on civilian targets;
indeed, 97% of the deaths and 93% of the injuries it has inflicted have
41
resulted from such attacks. Its operations away from Afghanistan and
Iraq thus do not involve anything resembling conventional combat. Its
activity, then, does not amount to armed conflict within the meaning of
the Geneva Conventions and their protocols, and thus is not addressed
by these legal instruments.
42
Professor Jinks has reached the opposite conclusion. He argues that
the criteria relevant for determining whether a particular action should
be deemed an armed conflict are: the intensity of the violence in
question; whether the group inflicting the violence has the resources and
organizational sophistication to engage in sustained hostilities; and how
the initiator of the action, the state victim of the action, third states, and
43
international organizations characterize the action. He also gives weight
to the duration of the conflict, asserting that a conflict lasting “only a few
months” would satisfy any requirement that an armed conflict be
“protracted,” and that the conflict between the United States and alQaeda had lasted at least from September 11, 2001, until the date of his
44
writing (presumably no earlier than some point in 2002). Regarding the
September 11 attacks, he observes that they were very violent, killing
approximately 3,000 people and causing extensive economic losses, that
al-Qaeda is clearly a well-organized and well-funded group, and that both
45
the United States and al-Qaeda characterize their relationship as “war.”
He also observes that the United Nations, NATO, and the OAS all took
actions, a necessary predicate of which was that the events of September
46
11 constituted an “armed attack.”
Professor Jinks’s argument regarding the September 11 attacks is
convincing. However, the issue is not whether the attacks on that day
amounted to armed conflict, but whether the period from September 11
through the present can properly be labeled the same way with respect to
activity taking place away from Iraq and Afghanistan. There are two
reasons to doubt Professor Jinks’s conclusion on this point.
First, no action by al-Qaeda since September 11, 2001, and away
from the two zones of open combat, has approached the intensity of the
47
violence on that day. Professor Jinks did not suggest that the bombings
40

See supra Part IV.
See MIPT/TKB, supra note 27 (searching for suicide attacks by al-Qaeda).
42
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003).
43
Id. at 25–33.
44
Id. at 28–29 & n.189.
45
Id. at 33–35, 37–38.
46
Id. at 35–37.
47
See MIPT/TKB, supra note 27 (follow “by Group” hyperlink, then follow “alQaeda” hyperlink). Note that this list does not include some incidents for which
41

1078

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:4

of the American embassies in East Africa in 1998 were large enough to
48
amount to an armed conflict, and that incident involved as many
49
fatalities as the worst of al-Qaeda’s post-September 11 attacks. If those
attacks were not sufficiently intense to be an armed conflict, then the
post-September 11 attacks would likewise not suffice in themselves.
Professor Jinks’s argument therefore requires reading the term “armed
conflict” to cover all violent acts by al-Qaeda subsequent to September 11
because of the scale of that one attack. This seems counter-intuitive. At
some point, an armed conflict ends. If the nature of the conflict is such
that a formal end to hostilities cannot be expected, then the ending of
the conflict can be determined only by the decline in levels of violence. It
seems unlikely that absolute peace must obtain before the levels of
violence should be considered too low to justify the armed conflict
designation—but if an armed conflict can end despite the persistence of
some violence, one must conclude that the armed conflict must be
deemed to have ended once violence drops below some minimum level
and does not exceed that level for some extended period of time. As of
this writing, it has been approximately five and one-half years since alQaeda launched an attack so intense that it clearly exceeded the armed
conflict threshold. This circumstance at least raises some question
whether any armed conflict that began on September 11 persists with
respect to al-Qaeda activities away from Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is a second reason to doubt whether al-Qaeda’s activities
outside combat zones amount to armed conflict, though it is more
abstract and therefore more doubtful. The argument is that all elements
of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols assume that armed conflict is
an activity in which it is possible for combatants to comply with
international humanitarian law, at least with respect to methods of using
violence and respect for legal limits on targeting. Obviously, all
combatants do not comply with the law, but presumably there is nothing

there is some reason to believe al-Qaeda was responsible, e.g., the bombings in
London on July 7, 2005, see Alan Cowell, British Police Arrest 3 in Connection with 2005
Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A3; the scale of these incidents, however, is
comparable to that of the scale of incidents attributed to al-Qaeda, see MIPT/TKB,
supra note 27 (follow “Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade” hyperlink; then follow “Abu Hafs
al-Masri Brigade and Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe attacked
Transportation target (July 7, 2005, United Kingdom)” hyperlink).
48
Jinks, supra note 42, at 35.
49
The attacks in East Africa took approximately 220 lives. See MIPT/TKB, supra
note 27 (follow “al-Qaeda” hyperlink; then follow “al-Qaeda attacked Diplomatic
target (Aug. 7, 1998, Kenya)” hyperlink under “Incidents” section). No incidents
attributed to al-Qaeda since September 11, 2001, (including the July 7, 2005
bombings in London, al-Qaeda responsibility for which has not been conclusively
established) have inflicted more fatalities, see id. (follow “by Group” hyperlink; then
follow “32” hyperlink next to “al-Qaeda”); see also id. (follow “Abu Hafs al-Masri
Brigade” hyperlink; then follow “Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade and Secret Organization
of al-Qaeda in Europe attacked Transportation target (July 7, 2005, United
Kingdom)” hyperlink).
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about the nature of their activity that would preclude compliance. AlQaeda, on the other hand, cannot comply with international
humanitarian law and carry out the strategy it has adopted. Most
obviously, al-Qaeda’s frequent targeting of civilians violates Articles 48
and 51 of Protocol I, provisions which Greenwood has argued codify
customary international law (except, arguably, Articles 51(4)(a)-(c) and
50
51(5)(a)). Al-Qaeda’s use of suicide attacks, furthermore, necessarily
requires the bomber to pretend to be a civilian and to conceal his
weapon, and actions of this sort surely amount to “perfidy” within the
51
meaning of Article 37 of Protocol I; Greenwood argues that this
52
provision also codifies customary law. But the use of suicide attacks
directed at civilian targets is not merely a practice which al-Qaeda could
abandon at will. On the contrary, if its strategy for obtaining its objectives
is to terrify Western populations into submission, it must use the methods
it has previously employed. It is hard to imagine how it could frighten
populations if it ceased its attacks on soft targets, and it is hard to see how
such attacks can be lawful in themselves or carried out other than
through the use of perfidious means. If that is so, however, al-Qaeda’s
basic principles of operation are fundamentally inconsistent with
international humanitarian law. If armed conflicts are those in which it is
possible to comply with humanitarian law, as argued above, an
organization that adopts the strategy al-Qaeda has chosen is not engaging
in armed conflict.
53
As noted above, the basic treaties governing international
humanitarian law apply in cases of armed conflict. If, as just argued, alQaeda’s operations outside combat zones do not qualify as armed
conflict, are states contending against al-Qaeda unable to rely on the
privileges conferred by the law of war? Certainly, some have taken this
position. Dworkin, for example, has argued that international human
54
rights law would control in such a circumstance. This conclusion is not
obvious, however.
In the first place, at least with respect to the United States, the only
55
relevant treaty would be the ICCPR. That treaty governs the behavior of
a party to it only with respect to individuals “within its territory and
56
subject to its jurisdiction.” The Human Rights Committee, established
by the ICCPR to monitor implementation of the treaty, has asserted that
this language means that “a State party must respect and ensure the
rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

GREENWOOD, 1977 Protocols, supra note 10, at 193–95.
Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 37.
GREENWOOD, 1977 Protocols, supra note 10, at 190–91.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 65–73.
ICCPR, supra note 4.
Id. art. 2.1.
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57

State Party.” However, nothing in the ICCPR obliges state parties to that
treaty to simply acquiesce in the Human Rights Committee’s reading of
58
the treaty —a that reading obviously ignores the plain language of the
treaty, which limits states’ obligations to their own territories. Further,
since article 6.1 of the ICCPR forbids governments to “arbitrarily” take
59
life, and that article is non-derogable according to article 4.2, it could
be applied in dealing with al-Qaeda only if arbitrariness were to be
60
assessed on some sort of a sliding scale, as Dworkin acknowledges. But
how would it be possible to devise such a scale, suitable for use in a wide
variety of situations where people under great pressure would be obliged
to make split-second decisions? And if we are dealing with a situation in
which it is very nearly impossible to imagine how to apply the ICCPR, one
may question whether the ICCPR was meant to apply to that situation.
Nor is it clear that the law of war would not apply to the treatment of
al-Qaeda members outside of combat zones. The history of the law of war
as it has developed since the mid-nineteenth century shows that, as
particular treaties have been shown by experience to be deficient in some
regard, they have been replaced by treaties intended to cure the
61
deficiency. The law of war is not static. As military technology changes
and human beings define themselves in new ways that lead to new forms
of organization for violence, the law of war must change with it or risk
irrelevancy. This follows from states’ motives for going to war.
It is crucial to remember that states do not go to war in order to have
the opportunity to display their fidelity to the law of war. States—
particularly early-twenty-first century states with popularly elected
governments—go to war in order to achieve goals that are seen as
particularly crucial. To the extent that the law of war, as it exists at any
given time, imposes significant barriers on a state’s ability to fulfill its
most essential responsibilities—e.g., protecting its civilian population
from large-scale politically motivated violence—there is considerable risk
that a state almost surely will—and probably should—depart from
existing conceptions of the law of war rather than fail the voters. If the
law of war is not to become irrelevant in the face of changing threats,
that body of law must be sufficiently flexible to depart from the letter of
treaties drafted before the emergence of particular types of dangers. We
must accept the possibility of gaps in the law and the necessity of filling
those gaps.

57
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
58
ICCPR, supra note 4. Cf. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Ninth Session, U.N. GAOR 52d Sess., Supp. No. 10, ¶
157, at 127, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (May 12–July 18, 1997).
59
ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 4(2), 6(1).
60
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 69–70.
61
UK Manual, supra note 23, at 7–19.
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In this case, we see that existing treaties purport to permit states to
resort to the privileges provided by the law of war only if a state finds
itself in an armed conflict of either an international or a noninternational character. Implicit in this arrangement is the assumption
that only armed conflict—that is, uses of violence analogous to
conventional combat—presents a state with a problem whose solution
demands the freedom of action provided by the law of war. The
September 11 attacks have falsified that assumption. Clearly, states can
face very serious risks of politically motivated violence quite apart from
an armed conflict situation. But the question then arises, if international
humanitarian law were to be extended to cover cases beyond those it now
reaches, how ought its area of application be defined? Since such an
extension would permit otherwise unlawful uses of violence, some
definition is necessary, but what would it be?
An extension of privileges developed in the context of inter-state war
to other kinds of conflict is most easily justified if these other types of
conflict pose risks to states comparable to those of war. As discussed
62
above, interstate war involves actions taken against an entity by a second
entity in order to coerce the first entity to conform to the wishes of the
second entity. The entities engaging and facing these coercive efforts are
states or analogous public entities, and the coercion—at least since the
beginning of the twentieth century—seeks some political objective. The
coercion takes the form of the infliction of high levels of violence causing
significant loss of life and damage to property; all states involved not only
seek to employ violence in this way but face the risk that they will be the
recipients of such violence. Individual participants in war, furthermore,
act as members of a group held together either by military discipline or
by common commitment to an ideological goal, and therefore cannot
necessarily be dissuaded from continuing their activities by appeals to
self-interest. In these circumstances, a state will focus heavily on
protecting itself from the acts of violence aimed at it. That is, it will seek
to prevent attacks on the lives and property of its inhabitants rather than
content itself with responding to attacks after the fact. And it is
commonly the case that a state that is the object of some other entity’s
war can protect itself from the harms war can do only by resorting to war
itself.
How does the threat the United States faces from al-Qaeda compare
63
to this paradigm of war? As discussed above, al-Qaeda’s goals are purely
political. Though almost surely unachievable, these goals include
absolute opposition to the United States and a determination to kill as
many Americans as possible. It has shown a capacity to operate
throughout the world. It has on one occasion inflicted damage of a level
most commonly associated with military action, and seeks the capability
to regularly cause very high levels of damage. However, as also discussed
62
63

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
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above, al-Qaeda has engaged in a relatively limited number of actions
since it began targeting American objectives in 1993, and killed over 90%
of its victims in only one day’s attacks, those of September 11. Its actions
since that time outside of Iraq and Afghanistan have not compared in
destructiveness to the September 11 attacks.
The picture, in short, is mixed. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda
seeks to do the United States tremendous harm, and has been able to do
so once. Its actions since September 11, 2001, however, have been much
less destructive than the attacks on that day. Surely the United States
faces a degree of political enmity from al-Qaeda comparable to a level
that would accompany a situation necessitating war. But does the risk it
faces rise to that level?
Estimating that risk is difficult. Certainly the United States asserts
that it sees itself as confronting that level of risk. According to the United
States Department of State:
The al-Qaida network has many of the characteristics of a
“globalized insurgency” and employs subversion, sabotage, open
warfare and, of course, terrorism. It seeks weapons of mass
destruction or other means to inflict massive damage on the United
States, our allies and interests, and the broader international
system. AQ aims to overthrow the existing world order and replace
it with a reactionary, authoritarian, transnational entity. This threat
will be sustained over a protracted period (decades not years) and
will require a global response executed regionally, nationally, and
64
locally.
Further, the United States is quite unequivocal in stating its intention to
continue to take preventive violent action to deal with terrorist threats,
65
presumably including those from al-Qaeda.
Further, focus on al-Qaeda’s relatively limited success since
September 11, 2001, must take account of the preventive measures that
66
the United States has implemented since that date. That is, the absence
of al-Qaeda attacks causing thousands of casualties outside of any combat
zone may not reflect so much the modesty of al-Qaeda’s capabilities as
the obstacles to al-Qaeda action which preventive steps have created. In
other words, if the United States had not taken an ex ante approach to
dealing with terrorism after September 11, it is possible that there would
have been more successful terrorist attacks than there have been.
The question, ultimately, must be how a relatively prudent
government would evaluate the risk al-Qaeda generates. While the
relatively limited character of al-Qaeda’s post-September 11 activity
64

U.S. Dep’t of State, The Terrorist Enemy, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy.
NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 11–12
(2006).
66
Some examples of preventative measures are enhanced screening of air
travelers, tighter controls on admission to departure areas of airports, and greater
scrutiny of applicants for visas to enter the United States.
65
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outside Iraq and Afghanistan might give pause, we do not know the
reason for this “restraint” and not only can we not assume that it will
continue, but must assume that al-Qaeda, all other things being equal,
would prefer that it did not continue. The calculation must also take into
account al-Qaeda’s objectives, its embrace of violence directed at soft
targets, its demonstrated ability to carry out small-scale (and one largescale) attacks world wide, and its desire to improve its capabilities. In
light of all this, it is difficult to see how a reasonably prudent government
could treat al-Qaeda as anything other than a threat whose operations
must be forestalled to the extent possible—including taking advantage of
opportunities to reduce al-Qaeda’s capabilities that require methods
irreconcilable with the strictures of the criminal law. In short, the United
States is justified in claiming the rights enjoyed by belligerent states
under the law of war in acting against al-Qaeda. That is, members of the
United States armed forces may lawfully kill members of al-Qaeda or take
them captive without facing the restrictions imposed on dealings with
persons falling under the system of criminal law.
But suppose, it might be argued, an al-Qaeda member was not on
the battlefield but was encountered on the streets of, say, a city in a
European state with a highly developed legal system or, for that matter, a
city in the United States. Does this argument mean that shooting that
person down as he feeds the pigeons would be lawful?
The answer is, as a matter of the rights of that individual under
international law, yes. This phrasing is necessary because using violence
against an individual in the context we have been addressing raises (at
least) three distinct legal questions. We have been addressing one of
these questions, that is, whether the individual is a lawful target of
violence as a matter of international law. But the other two must be
addressed as well.
One of these questions is: Does international law permit the entity
using violence to do so in the place where the violence is used? If an alQaeda member is encountered on land outside a zone of open conflict,
he necessarily will be in the territory of some state. If the state desiring to
use violence is not the territorial sovereign, that state would violate the
sovereignty of the sovereign by using violence in its territory without its
permission. It needs no citation to establish that such a violation of
sovereignty would be contrary to international law. The problem, it must
be stressed, is not that some rights of the al-Qaeda member would be
violated, but that the authority of the territorial sovereign would be
ignored. Since this Article is concerned only with the rights of the alQaeda member as a matter of international law, this sovereignty problem
is not addressed here, except to note that it exists and that it imposes
legal restraints on the use of force quite apart from restraints flowing
from the status of the person against whom violence is directed.
Another legal issue relevant to the issue of shooting al-Qaeda
members on sight relates to the law of the entity seeking to use force. If
that entity is a state, its internal law may impose restraints on the
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authority of its security forces to use violence which are stricter than
those imposed by international law. For example, during the American
Civil War, the United States forces sought to comply with the laws of war
67
as formulated by Dr. Francis Lieber, even though Lieber’s formulation
itself assumed that application of the laws of war to rebels would be a
68
matter of “humanity,” rather than legal obligation.
It is thus easy to imagine legal barriers to killing al-Qaeda members
engaged in innocuous activities. What is important, however, is that such
barriers arise from legal rules have nothing to do with the status of the alQaeda member himself. His own rights under international law are no
greater than those of any one participating in combat.
VI. AL-QAEDA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
69

As noted above, al-Qaeda’s methods of operation are, in and of
themselves, unlawful according to international humanitarian law. Some
of the implications of this statement are not obvious, and are worth
pondering.
First, it is important that we disabuse ourselves of the idea that alQaeda’s methods are uniquely inhumane. During World War II, the
Allies directed aerial attacks at civilians in order to lower their morale—
that is, their will to continue fighting—an objective little different from
that attributed to al-Qaeda. The United States, in March 1945, began a
campaign of incendiary bombing of Japan, wherein little effort was made
70
to concentrate on military targets. This campaign is estimated to have
71
killed 900,000 Japanese civilians. A similar campaign was directed
72
73
against Germany; the British specifically intended to incinerate cities.
74
Allied bombing killed 305,000 German civilians. Use of such methods
by Western states no more than sixty-five or so years ago makes it difficult
to argue that a strategy of terror can only spring from the minds of
individuals wholly alien to the vast majority of human beings.
Nor can it be said that the laws of war are grounded solely on
determinations of the relative inhumanity of particular methods of
waging war. Among other things, self-interest plays a role. Opposition to
67
See U.S. WAR DEP’T, GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Apr. 24, 1863),
reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45–71,
115–16 (1983) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE].
68
See id. at 70–71.
69
See supra Parts IV–V.
70
ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIR POWER AND COERCION IN WAR 92–94,
103–04 (1996).
71
Id. at 104.
72
Id. at 260–62, 269–72.
73
Id. at 269–70.
74
Id. at 272.
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particular weapons or methods of fighting has arisen because of their
75
threats to social distinctions, or because particular weapons or tactics
76
were particularly helpful or harmful to some states more than to others.
When we label al-Qaeda’s tactics unlawful, therefore, we do so with
the knowledge that our own past actions, if evaluated under
contemporary standards, might well be considered unlawful, and the
realization that the laws of war as currently crafted reflect, to a certain
extent, a calculation of the interest of those who took part in framing
those laws—principally states.
Now, it has long been a given for students of international
humanitarian law that “[t]he principle of equality of the belligerents
underlies the law of armed conflict; in other words, as a matter of law,
there can be no wars in which one side has all the rights and the other
77
has none.” However, as General Smith has observed, wars of the sort we
have called “conventional” are likely a thing of the past, even though the
armed forces of states continue to be structured primarily to fight such
78
wars. Rather, future wars are likely to be conflicts in which purely
military solutions are unlikely to be available, where the actual objective
will be to influence the will of a particular population rather than to
79
occupy ground or destroy opposing armed forces. Future wars, that is,
80
are likely to involve states on one side and non-state actors on the other.
And non-state actors, taking the will of the people as their objective, are
more likely to employ tactics similar to those of al-Qaeda than to fight in
a way that fits within existing concepts of the laws of war.
The consequence of these developments is that the principle of
equality between opponents in armed conflict must come into question.
To be sure, one could argue that such a development could be avoided if
only non-state actors would fight according to the rules of international
humanitarian law, but this argument flies in the face of the fact that
acceptance of the limitations of international humanitarian law by a
group like al-Qaeda amounts to abandoning any possibility of fighting at
all. The issue therefore arises: Should international humanitarian law be
modified to reflect the likely shape of future conflicts between
adversaries who differ radically in their ability and incentive to comply
with existing law?
I would argue that there should be no modification. Granted, this
would mean that non-state actors such as al-Qaeda would continue to be

75
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regarded as simply beyond the pale even though their tactics reflect, at
least in part, their weakness, and differ only in their smaller scale from
tactics employed by Western states in World War II. Granted, the effect of
a refusal to change the law of war would be that certain causes can never
be advanced by force, given the likely material weakness of their
adherents. But the issue cannot be some notion of abstract fairness. The
conflict with al-Qaeda is not a game, and a sporting attitude is out of
place. The current rules of war favor us, certainly, but also reflect values
that we see as worthwhile in themselves. If those rules disfavor groups
whose ends can be obtained only through attacks on people who cannot
defend themselves, is that such a bad thing?
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that international law permits treating
members of al-Qaeda, as far as their personal rights are concerned, as
combatants on a battlefield even if they are found distant from a zone of
combat, in light of the risk al-Qaeda must be assumed to pose and what I
have taken to be the rationale for privileging some uses of violence in the
law of war. I have also observed that future conflicts are highly likely to
involve entities resembling al-Qaeda on one side and states on the other
and that existing rules effectively criminalize the only tactics available to
such groups. I have further argued that it is desirable that the law of war
not change to reflect this situation, despite its tradition of “evenhandedness” because there is no reason to accommodate such groups.
There is one last thought that seems relevant to this discussion. As
81
many have noted, enforcement of the rules of war depends in part on
reciprocity—states expect that their opponents will respect international
humanitarian law if they do so. However, that expectation of reciprocity
has not been and cannot be met in conflicts against al-Qaeda and its ilk,
given their tactics. To date, as far as we know, American forces have not
seen themselves as entitled to “reciprocate” by discarding international
humanitarian law wholesale in their dealings with al-Qaeda,
notwithstanding certain well documented cases of abuse. A question to
ponder is, can this desirable state of affairs continue? As the conflict with
al-Qaeda goes on, particularly if there are more spectacular terrorist
attacks within the United States, will the United States persist in its
attempts to, more or less, adhere to international humanitarian law?
There is no concrete reason to doubt that the United States will maintain
at least the ideal of fidelity to law—and yet, one may legitimately fear that
one consequence of al-Qaeda’s interaction with the law of war will be the
degradation of that body of law, not just by al-Qaeda, but by its
adversaries.
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